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Introduction
There has been an extensive literature written on the invasion and domination of Vietnam by 
Japanese militarists (hereafter ?the Japanese? for short), and on Vietnamese political parties and reli-
gious organizations that relied on the Japanese for patronage to various extents. They provide the basic 
information to understand the relationship between some Vietnamese and the Japanese in the Second 
World War and to explore valuable historical experiences for the building of Vietnam?Japan relations 
in the modern age.
In the Second World War, Japanese militarists invaded Vietnam. Their crimes brought sorrows to 
many hearts not only of the Vietnamese but also the Japanese. Before and during the invasion of 
Vietnam, the Japanese launched a series of mass mobilisation campaigns to promote the doctrine of 
Greater East Asia, which held that yellow people (Asian) should not accept foreign rulers who had 
?blue eyes and white skin? on their territory, and praised the role of Japan in supporting Vietnamese in 
their struggle against the French.
Many Vietnamese at the time, who failed to see the true intentions of the Japanese, had an illusion 
that they could depend on Japan to eliminate the French domination and regain national indepen-
dence. Those Vietnamese thus chose to support and cooperate with the Japanese and formed many 
political parties, notably Việt Nam Phục quốc Đồng minh hội (Vietnam National Restoration League), 
Việt Nam Phục quốc đảng (Vietnam Restoration Party), Việt Nam Dân chính đảng (Vietnam Demo-
cratic Party), Việt Nam Hưng quốc Cách mạng đảng (Vietnam Revolutionary Party for National Pros-
perity), Đại Việt Quốc xã (Great Vietnam Nationalist League), Đảng Việt Nam Ái quốc (Vietnam Patri-
otic Party), Đảng Đại Việt Quốc gia Liên minh (Great Vietnam National Unity Party), Thanh niên Ái 
quốc đoàn (The Youth Patriots), and Đại Việt Quốc dân đảng (Nationalist Party of Great Vietnam).
After the Japanese overthrow of the French in Indochina (March 3, 1945), apart from the establish-
ment of political parties, some Vietnamese also cooperated in the formation of a pro-Japanese govern-
ment in the hope of ?gaining independence.? Their decision not only ran counter to the will and wishes 
of the Vietnamese people and was incompatible with the historical conditions, but was also turned 
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into a tool for the Japanese to repress the movement of national liberation.
The relationship between Vietnam and Japan at the time was truly regrettable. However, it left many 
historical experiences for the building and development of a good relationship between the two coun-
tries today: respecting each other?s independence, sovereignty and political system; cooperation on the 
grounds of mutual trust and mutual benefit for both peoples, for peace and stability in the region and 
in the world.
1. Before the Japanese invaded Indochina, there had been Vietnamese who wanted to escape 
from the domination of French colonial rulers, yet only passively waited for Japanese help
Under French domination, Vietnam became a colony. The country lost its independence. The people 
lost their freedom. Thus, independence and freedom became the burning desires of all enslaved 
Vietnamese. From the time of the Meiji Reform (beginning in 1868), Japan quickly emerged as a 
powerful empire that could protect its national independence against the threat from Western capi-
talism. Thus in the eyes of many Vietnamese patriots, Japan was a role model for all Eastern peoples, a 
?yellow brother? that Vietnam could rely on to defeat the white colonial rulers. In the early 20th 
century, with the aim of seeking Japanese support, Phan Bội Châu and other patriots initiated the 
Đông du (Eastern Study) movement with the hope of rallying Japanese support for their quest for 
independence. The movement was unsuccessful. However, many Vietnamese still had admiration for 
Japan. They did not know that the Japanese empire had already targeted Vietnam in particular and 
Indochinese countries in general for their plan of invasion and domination.
In the 1930s, the land to the south of China began attracting Japanese attention because they 
believed that the area could be turned into a colony where they could extract supplies of food and fuel 
for their army. The Nanshin (Southward Advancement) plan was formulated and implemented by 
members of Black Dragon, a Japanese intelligence agency1 to collect information on the population 
and cultures of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.2 Following the Nanshin plan, the Center for Southeast 
Asian Studies (Tonan Ajia Kenkyu Senta) was established by Japanese intelligence commanders to 
propagate the doctrine of a ?Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere? (Daito A Kyoeiken). Black 
Dragon units spread this doctrine using slogans like ?East Asia for East Asians? and ?An independent 
Vietnam in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.? Together with Black Dragon forces, a number 
 1 In the late 19th century, when the Japanese were preparing for ?the expansion of the empire across the globe,? the Japanese Em-
pire established the Kempeitai (law enforcement force), whose mission was to monitor the army?s internal aﬀairs, and to gath-
er intelligence. The strategic intelligence unit, named Black Dragon, grew rapidly in China. Its members were disguised as 
consulate staﬀ members, teachers of Japanese language, clockmakers or photographers. Many infiltrated street gangs, gather-
ing new members from among the locals. After the Sino?Japanese War (1894), Japan planned to invade neighbouring coun-
tries by means of establishing organizations such as the Indochinese Study group, Asian Study group, and Chinese study 
group to serve intelligence activities, including the Black Dragon.
 2 Black Dragon members followed traditional martial arts troupes and medicine peddlers to travel across cities and villages in 
Indochina. They complied reports on French Indochina that provided detailed descriptions of natural resources, the economy, 
politics, social structure, from the lives of colonial and feudal rulers with everyday practices, customs and beliefs of ordinary 
people. 
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of Japanese agents were also sent to Vietnam.3 Japan also provided allowance to Marquess Cường Để4 
to live in Tokyo in the 1930s, with the aim of using him as a political card for the plan of invading 
Vietnam. In 1935, as the President of Vietnam National Restoration League, Cường Để5 received a 
guarantee of assistance from Japanese intelligence agencies. Mistaking the Japanese promise as a 
gesture of goodwill, when the Japanese entered Indochina, Cường Để sent liaisons to Vietnam to make 
contact with anti-French groups6 and to establish bases of his Vietnam National Restoration League in 
some localities in the country.
Before the Second World War, two new religious sects were formed in southern Vietnam: the Cao 
Đài and Hoà Hảo. Some individuals, notably Phạm Công Tắc, Huỳnh Phú Sổ, Cao Đức Trọng, Trần 
Quang Vinh, and Đặng Trung Chữ met Yamaguchi, a Japanese agent. Phạm Công Tắc called for the 
establishment of an organization to support Cường Để and the Japanese. The French Minister of Colo-
nies Georges Mandel was correct when treating the Cao Đài as a legal organization (1938), while also 
remaining suspicious of the connections between leaders of this religious sect and the movement led 
by Cường Để in Japan.
In general, from the mid-1930s, the number of Japanese in Vietnam increased rapidly. Whether on 
purpose or by mistake, many Vietnamese cooperated with Japanese intelligence out of hatred against 
French domination or out of failure to see the true intentions of the Japanese. Their cooperation thus 
allowed the Japanese to gather information necessary for their forthcoming invasion of Indochina.
2. Having failed to recognise Japan?s plan of invasion and the cooperation between Japan and 
France, some Vietnamese established pro-Japanese political parties in the hope of gaining 
independence
In September 1939, the Second World War began and quickly spread across the globe. The Japanese 
escalated the invasion of China and sent troops to the border with Vietnam, threatening to invade 
Indochina. After France surrendered to Germany in Europe (June 1940), the Japanese increased pres-
sure to force the French in Indochina to make compromise.7 In September 1940, the Japanese entered 
 3 In Saigon in 1936, Yamaguchi, a Japanese agent disguised as a student studying the history of the Nguyễn dynasty, befriended 
many Vietnamese scholars and politicians to propagate the doctrine of Greater East Asia and the role of Japan in supporting 
anti-French movements of the Vietnamese. 
 4 Cường Để, whose true name was Nguyễn Phúc Hồng Dân, was born on February 28, 1882 in the Imperial Citadel (Huế), a de-
scendant of former Crown Prince Nguyễn Phúc Cảnh, the eldest son of Emperor Gia Long. In 1904, Hồng Dân, was invited by 
Phan Bội Châu to become President of the Renovation movement, when he adopted the name Cường Để. During his stay in 
China, he also used other names such as Lý Cảnh Thành, Lâm Thuận Đức. 
 5 At the time Cường Để used the Japanese name Minami. 
 6 In 1939, Cường Để founded the Restoration movement. In September 1940, he sent Trần Văn An and Hoàng Nam Hùng to 
Vietnam. When Hoàng Nam Hùng, Trần Trung Lập, and Hoàng Lương orchestrated an uprising in Đồng Đăng and Lạng Sơn, 
Trần Văn An returned to Saigon to build up his forces and gather anti-French elements in Vietnam, including the Great Viet-
nam branch led by Ngô Đình Diệm in Huế, the Great Vietnam branch led by Trương Tử Anh in Hà Nội and groups led by Vũ 
Đình Duy and Hồ Văn Ngà in Saigon. Trần Văn An also managed to establish contact with the Cao Đài and Hoà Hảo.
 7 On June 19, 1940, Japan sent an ultimatum to Indochina Governor-General Indochina G. Catroux, ordering the French to 
close the Vietnam?China border. On August 30, 1940, the Vichy government signed a treaty with Tokyo allowing Japan to 
send 25,000 troops to Indochina and to use certain airports and seaports in the colony. On the morning of September 22, 
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Indochina and pursued a two-sided policy. On the one hand, they stationed troops across the country, 
yet maintained and used the colonial governing apparatus, on the condition that the French would 
?cooperate? with Japan in all aspects and help enhance its war eﬀorts.8 On the other hand, they sought 
to win the support of anti-French Vietnamese in order to create the social base for Japanese domina-
tion and to monitor French movements so as to overthrow the French when necessary.
To this end, Japan continuously propagated the slogan of ?liberating Asia? and ?building the Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere? to legitimize their invasion and win the support of Vietnamese. The 
Japanese Central Command in Indochina asserted that they would pay particular attention to winning 
the support of the local population. In order to achieve that, it was necessary to foster propaganda that 
would help form an image amongst the Vietnamese public of the Japanese as liberators who respected 
their right to independence and would rescue them from French domination. The Japanese military 
authorities also hoped that the Vietnamese would collaborate with them in the formation of a new 
Greater East Asia Sphere and in their struggles to liberate East Asia.
Apart from advocating the ?Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,? Japan also opened centers to 
propagate Japanese culture and language in Hanoi and Saigon. Delegations of Japanese intellectuals and 
Buddhists were encouraged to visit Cochinchina, and later Vietnamese patriotic scholars were invited to 
Japan. Some Japanese individuals and organizations also established ties with members of ?indigenous 
nationalist? movements. Some Japanese monks travelled across the three Indochinese countries to prop-
agate the idea that yellow people should not accept the presence of those who had ?blue eyes and white 
skin? in their territory. The Japanese also established the Vietnam National Restoration League and 
publicly announced the plan of bringing Cường Để home to replace Bảo Đại as the new emperor.
In 1943, Japan sent Matsui9 to Saigon to foster the propagation of the doctrine of Greater East Asia 
and to gather former members of the Renovation movement to nurture anti-French sentiments in 
Vietnam. In Tokyo, Japanese press released General Matsui?s statements in Saigon that intended to 
inspire ?patriotism? among Vietnamese young intellectuals. These policies eventually led to the unifi-
cation of pro-Japanese forces in Vietnam. Even those Vietnamese who had hitherto pursued the policy 
of ?cooperating? with the French, being loyal to the French and who had even sworn that they would 
never cooperate with any other power if France was defeated by Germany, began to praise the arrival 
of the Japanese in Indochina. Lê Quang Liêm wrote, ?Thanks to the Japanese, the grain production in 
Indochina will be rescued. The people of this land will have enough goods to consume, at low prices. 
This will benefit particularly the poor.?10
Apart from launching propaganda campaigns, the Japanese also sought to establish pro-Japanese 
1940, Japanese troops attacked French military posts in Lạng Sơn, landed on Đồ Sơn and bombed Hải Phòng port. That after-
noon the French accepted the supplement to the previous treaty, which regulated the terms and conditions of the stationing of 
Japanese troops in Indochina, marking the surrender of the French to the Japanese militarists.
 8 The strategic aims of the Japanese when they invaded Indochina were to extract manpower and resources (notably rice, rubber 
and coal) to serve the war eﬀort and to turn Indochina into a strategic base to expand their invasion in the region.
 9 Matsui was an intelligence commander who led Black Dragon units in China. 
10 Lục tỉnh Tân văn (magazine), 19-7-1940.
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groups across Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina. Many anti-French intellectuals across Vietnam were 
secretly recruited in diﬀerent groups and organizations. Some Vietnamese who had long been nurtured 
by the Japanese then became the latter?s tools to propagate anti-French sentiments, and became 
supporters of Japanese war eﬀorts. The most prominent among these were Trần Trung Lập, Hoàng 
Lương, and Ngô Văn Ba. Under the leadership of Colonel Shibata, in November 1940, only two months 
after the Japanese troops arrived in Indochina, a pro-Japanese political organization, Việt Nam Phục 
quốc Đảng (Vietnam National Restoration Party) was established with branches across Tonkin, Annam 
and Cochinchina. The leaders of this organization in Tonkin were Trần Trung Lập, Ngô Văn Ba and 
Matsui; in Annam Ngô Đình Diệm, and Ngô Đình Khôi; in Cochinchina Trần Văn An, Lương Văn 
Tượng, Trần Quang Vinh, Ngô Đình Đậu and the President of Great Vietnam Company Matsushita.
A number of pro-Japanese parties emerged: Vietnam National Restoration League (led by Cường Để 
with branches across the three parts of Vietnam), Great Vietnam Democratic Party and Vietnam 
Youth Patriots (which had bases amongst intellectuals in Tonkin and Annam), Vietnam Revolutionary 
Party for National Prosperity and The Great Vietnam Nationalist League (led by Trương Đình Trí), 
Vietnam Patriotic Party (led by Nguyễn Xuân Chữ, Vũ Đình Dy and Lê Toàn), and Great Vietnam 
National Unity Party (led by Nguyen Thế Nghiệp). The Nationalist Party of Greater Vietnam was a 
political organization which merged diﬀerent parties, notably the groups Hưng Việt founded by 
Nguyễn Tường Tam and Great Vietnam Democracy by Nguyễn Tiến Lâu (12-1940).
There were also many pro-Japanese parties that claimed to represent ?the entire nation? although 
they were only small groups with a few members and no popular support without political agenda or 
terms of membership. For example, in Annam, the Annam National Restoration League and Vietnam 
Youth Patriots were established in Huế), and Inter-Japanese Youth in Quảng Nam, following Matsushi-
ta?s instructions. They exploited the conflicts between the masses and local French authorities. Every-
where they raised slogans such as ?Support Great Japan,? ?Place Cường Để on the throne,? ?Throw the 
French out of Indochina?? In Tonkin, there were other groups, including Restoration, Vietnam 
Nationalist Party, Vietnam National Independence Party, and Veterans Association.
3. Many Vietnamese followers of anti-French religious sects also sought help from the Japanese
Besides the establishment of political parties, the Japanese also utilized anti-French religious sects, 
particularly Cao Đài and Hoà Hảo Buddhism in Cochinchina.
The Cao Đài movement was founded in 1926 in Cochinchina. The religion was divided into several 
groups, among which the most influential was the Tây Ninh group. After the Japanese arrived in 
Indochina, the Restoration League and the Cao Đài both sent representatives to contact Cường Để. The 
leaders of this religion publicly announced their pro-Japanese policy. Therefore, from 1940, the French 
colonial rulers suppressed this sect, shut down the worship sites and sentenced exile or house detention to 
some of the leaders. For example, Phạm Công Tắc was banished to Madagascar. The Japanese could not 
openly stop these French actions. Instead, they secretly helped Trần Quang Vinh, a high-ranking cler-
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gyman of the Tây Ninh group, to organize a new Cao Đài board of leaders. Supported by the Japanese, 
Trần Quang Vinh quickly restored the influence of the religion and began calling for donations to 
purchase weapons to fight the French. From July 1941, Cao Đài cooperated closely with the Japanese. The 
Japanese supported and protected them and helped train a paramilitary force of 3,000 men, most of whom 
were workers in the Japanese ship-repairing workshop in Saigon. Before the Japanese overthrow of the 
French, many pro-Japanese groups in Cochinchina expected the new regime in Vietnam with ?Cường Để 
as emperor, Ngô Đình Diệm as prime minister, and Cao Đài as the national religion.?
Huỳnh Phú Sổ founded Hoà Hảo (or Hoà Hảo Buddhism) in September 1939, with a large number 
of followers in Châu Đốc, Long Xuyên and Sa Đéc. As Huỳnh Phú Sổ had made many prophecies 
about the forthcoming collapse of the French colonialism, in 1941 the French rulers arrested, put him 
in the Chợ Quán mental hospital and then detained him in Bạc Liêu. However, the Hoà Hảo did not 
stop growing, but attracted more followers especially from 1942. In May 1942, the French planned to 
send Huỳnh Phú Sổ to house detention in Cambodia. However, the Japanese forestalled them, sending 
agents to Bạc Liêu to escort Huỳnh Phú Sổ to Saigon and put him under the Japanese protection. The 
Japanese sent Huỳnh Phú Sổ twice to Mekong Delta provinces for preaching. He encouraged local 
farmers to supply rice to the Japanese army. Thus, the Hoà Hảo was one of the two largest pro-Japanese 
religious sects in Indochina, though it had no paramilitary force.
In 1943, the pro-Japanese Vietnamese arranged to ?hold a big ceremony? to welcome Matsui when 
he visited Saigon. Matsui gave a speech in front of Vietnamese journalists condemning French, British 
and American colonial rulers. He declared firmly, ?The Japanese will help Asian nations, regardless of 
the desires of the American, British and French.? However, as the French rulers knew that the Japanese 
had no plan to do anything radical, they decided to arrest some pro-Japanese activists, such as Trần 
Văn Lai, Nguyễn Trác, Lê Đức, Phạm Lợi, Hồ Nhật Tân, Giác Quế? Some others?Trần Trọng Kim, 
Dương Bá Trạc, and Đặng Văn Ký?were frightened and took shelter at Japanese headquarters. The 
Japanese sent them to Singapore. The Japanese failure to suﬃciently protect them against the French 
intelligence?s suppression disappointed many people who had believed that ?the Japanese are heroes.?
4. Hope and disappointment?the ?bitterness? of the pro-Japanese when Japan overthrew the 
French in Indochina
Since their early days in Indochina, the Japanese had been aware that pro-Japanese groups and indi-
viduals in Vietnam were poorly organized, split into small factions that did not cooperate with each 
other and would not have the capacity to lead a native government that could eﬀectively cooperate. In 
January 1945, in a meeting at the Central Command of the Army in Tokyo, Lieutenant General Sanada 
stated that there was no Vietnamese leader that could represent Vietnam with ?independence.? The 
military leaders in Indochina soon disclosed their idea to exclude Cường Để and Ngô Đình Diệm from 
their plans. On February 20, 1945, the Commander of Japanese army in Indochina Tsuchihashi 
informed Consul Tsukamoto in Saigon that for the time being, no Vietnamese political exiles should 
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be allowed to return home. A few days later, however, a diplomat came from Tokyo and attempted to 
persuade Tsuchihashi to allow Cường Để to return to Vietnam and to enthrone him. The general, 
however, replied that Cường Để might be able to return, but as soon as he landed in Saigon airport, he 
would be arrested and sentenced to exile in Côn Đảo.11
In 1945, the war situation for Japan was worsening. The Allies began bombing campaigns against 
Indochina, where Japanese troops were stationed. To protect themselves against possible French 
betrayal and to keep Indochina open as a pathway to other parts in the southern region, the Japanese 
carried out a coup against the French on March 9. The French put up weak resistance and quickly 
surrendered. The Japanese took full control of Indochina. In Cochinchina, pro-Japanese forces, 
including the Cao Đài ?Local Righteous Army? Cao Đài and the Hoà Hảo ?League of Righteous 
Soldiers? assisted the Japanese in disarming the French. In many places, local people even placed altars 
on the roads, waiting to welcome Cường Để back to inherit the throne, although in the end he did not 
return.
After overthrowing the French, the Japanese quickly appointed their high-ranking military oﬃcers 
to replace the colonial Governor-General, Governor of Cochinchina, and the Résidents Supérieurs of 
Tonkin and Annam. General Tsuchihashi issued a press release stating that the administrative and 
legal system and all previous rules and regulations would remain unchanged. ?All government oﬃcials, 
whoever they are, will be protected and allowed to continue their job if they cooperate with the 
Japanese army.?
Emperor Bảo Đại immediately accepted the replacement of the old master with a new one. On 
March 11, 1945, following the Japanese suggestion and permission, he declared Annam ?independent? 
and the establishment of the Great Vietnam Empire. He also declared that Vietnam would ?consider 
itself a part of Greater East Asia, and would contribute resources and eﬀorts to the co-prosperity. The 
government of Vietnam thus would sincerely trust and cooperate with Japan, and would mobilise all 
national resources to achieve that goal.?12
In March 1945, Japan brought Trần Trọng Kim13 from exile back to Saigon, then Huế and arranged 
for him to become Prime Minister of the new government under Bảo Đại. On April 17, 1945, his 
cabinet was formed. Phạm Khắc Hoè wrote in his memoir:
?The Declaration of the Trần Trọng Kim cabinet presented a relatively comprehensive political agenda. 
It called for the people ?to work hard, sacrifice more and to sincerely cooperate with the Great Japan 
(author?s emphasis) in the construction of Greater East Asia. If the co-prosperity of Greater East Asia is 
successfully established, then independence of our country will not be just a short-lived dream.??
The pro-Japanese groups had high hopes that independence would be brought by the Japanese. The 
leaders of the Cao Đài, Restoration League and Vietnam National Independence Party distributed tens 
11 Cà Mau province?Online Portal, 22-9-2014.
12 Dương Trung Quốc: Việt Nam: những sự kiện lịch sử (1919?1945) (Hanoi: Giáo Dục, 2001), p. 388.
13 Trần Trọng Kim was a non-partisan patriotic intellectual, who had worked as an educator and historian. Although he was an 
enthusiastic patriot, he was not a revolutionary.
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of thousands of leaflets, calling for people in Cochinchina to show gratitude toward the Japanese 
empire. They held a massive parade at the centre of Saigon. Hồ Văn Ngà, on behalf of the Vietnam 
National Independence Party, and Trần Quang Vinh, on behalf of the Cao Đài, delivered speeches to 
express gratitude to the liberation by the Japanese army. However, when Trần Quang Vinh and Hồ Văn 
Ngà shouted out the slogans ?Long live the invincible Japanese army,? the masses instead shouted back 
the slogans ?Independence for Vietnam!? and ?Unification for Vietnam!? These groups also launched 
demonstrations in Saigon and other localities to call for the Japanese to expel the French working in 
public agencies and replace them with Vietnamese. They also expressed the wish that the Japanese 
would return independence to Cochinchina, which had not been included in the ?independent? 
Empire under Bảo Đại and Trần Trọng Kim and was ruled by Governor Fujio Minoda (As a directly 
ruled colony, it had already been separate from the protectorates of Tonkin and Annam, and the 
Japanese maintained that separate status).
The number of organizations and parties grew rapidly in the cities where the Japanese troops were 
stationed; there were over 30 parties in Tonkin alone.14 According to the Ngày Nay [Today] magazine 
(May 5, 1945), ?After a short storm of fire, political parties, societies and leagues sprouted up like 
mushrooms.? In Tonkin and Annam there were the New Vietnam National Party, Great Vietnam 
National Party, National Service Party, Vietnam League for Building Independence, Vietnam Youth 
Patriots, New Vietnam Association, Vietnam Student Union, and Union of Civil Servants, among 
others. In Cochinchina, the number of political, military and religious organizations and parties was 
even larger than in Tonkin. Apart from the organizations already in operation such as Restoration 
League, Cao Đài and Hoà Hảo, a number of new organizations were established or emerged publicly, 
such as Vietnam National Party, Vietnam National Independence Party, Huỳnh Long Party, Federation 
of Civil Servants and the Veterans Association? Though not all of these organizations were 
pro-Japanese, most of them were formed by pro-Japanese individuals and locally based. Most 
members in the Student Union, Federation of Civil Servants and Vanguard Youth were influenced by 
communist revolutionaries. Pro-Japanese parties such as Vietnam National Independence Party and 
Restoration had no credibility amongst the masses.
Bảo Đại
However, decisions made by the Japanese after March 9, 1945 strongly disappointed pro-Japanese 
?nationalists,? particularly in Cochinchina. Despite their eﬀorts to persuade the Japanese to restore the 
unity of Vietnam, the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet failed to achieve independence for the whole nation. 
Moreover, when the Japanese troops attacked revolutionary bases of the Việt Minh, they heavily 
repressed patriots in villages and gathered grain to supply to the Japanese army. Why did the govern-
ment of Bảo Đại and Trần Trọng Kim fail to notice these crimes? Was it because they blindly believed 
in Japanese ?good will,? or they were busy in negotiating with Japan over the right to govern an ?inde-
14 Tin Mới (magazine), 10-5-1945. 
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pendent? country, a right that they had never had. If they did know about Japanese crimes, then were 
they forced to ?let things be done against their own will??
During the early days of August 1945, the U.S dropped two atomic bombs on Japan and the Soviet 
Red Army started attacking the Japanese troops in Manchuria. The Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet in 
Vietnam fell into crisis and finally dissolved itself. When the 1945 August Revolution broke out and 
succeeded, the pro-Japanese organizations also self-disintegrated or transformed into diﬀerent polit-
ical groups. Some joined the Việt Minh, others relocated their operations outside the country, and 
some went over to the French.
5. Historical lessons
The Vietnam?Japan relationship in the Second World War was an abnormal one. The ?indepen-
dence? of Vietnam in Greater East Asia as the Japanese claimed was in practice an illusion. Eventually 
all the hope and trust of the pro-Japanese Vietnamese vanished. This painful historical period, 
however, left many valuable lessons for the two countries today.
First, a good relationship can be only established and developed on the grounds of truly respecting each 
other?s independence, sovereignty and political regime.
The stationing of Japanese troops in Vietnam in the Second World War was an act of invasion. 
When the Japanese arrived in Vietnam, they did not want to liberate Vietnam from the French colo-
nial domination, but only wanted to realise the dream of ?Greater East Asia? with Japan as the leader of 
the entire Asia. Japan?s main goal was to turn Vietnam into a colony to serve Japanese war eﬀorts in 
Asia-Pacific. What the Japanese needed was an administration and a base for their domination, rather 
than a government that could achieve true independence for Vietnam. This was the ultimate aim of the 
Japanese when they cooperated with and later overthrew the French, when they planned to use and 
later discarded Cường Để and Ngô Đình Diệm as their potential local collaborators, and when they 
took advantage of and later abandoned pro-Japanese political parties and religious sects.
The pro-Japanese political parties and religious sects, although their numbers may have reached 
several hundred thousands, still constituted only a small portion of the Vietnamese population. They 
lacked unity and solidarity. They did not represent the will and wish of the entire people. When the 
majority of Vietnamese regarded the Japanese troops in Indochina as invaders, these pro-Japanese 
political parties and religious sects considered Japan to be a savior and thus were utilised by the 
Japanese for their plan of dividing Vietnam and Vietnamese people. The Japanese did not intend to 
hand over Cochinchina to the Vietnamese. They considered it their new colony. They did not decide to 
?transfer? control of Cochinchina to the government of Bảo Đại?Trần Trọng Kim, until they were 
totally defeated in the war. It was too late. This showed that the Japanese had no respect for the 
long-established unity of Vietnam.
In short, Japan cared little about the independence and unity of Vietnam. They did not really respect 
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the political regime, which they had established in Vietnam. Historical experience has shown that a 
prerequisite for a relationship between nations should be mutual respect for national independence, 
equality and national self-determination. These are also principles of modern international relations as 
regulated in the Charter of the United Nations.
Second, true cooperation can only be achieved based on mutual trust, for the benefit of people in both 
countries, for peace and stability in the region and in the world.
In practice, the wartime relationship between Japan and some pro-Japanese Vietnamese, whether 
political parties, religious sects or individuals, was only what is called in Vietnamese ?same bed, 
diﬀerent dreams.? Whether these Vietnamese truly believed in the Japanese or only wanted to take 
advantage of them, they were too naïve when they believed in Japan?s good will, and considered it a 
savior that would selflessly help Vietnam to regain independence. The illusion ultimately vanished. It 
was a pity that they had failed to recognise that after the Japanese overthrow of the French, Vietnam 
would be Japan?s colony.
Japan?s real strategic goals were hidden behind the doctrine of Greater East Asia and the 
Co-prosperity Sphere. Those Vietnamese who were ?nationalists? actually did nothing, except for 
relying on and supporting Japan in exchange for ?an illusion of independence.? Japan certainly had no 
faith in those unorganized and fragmented organizations with no clear political agendas or credibility 
amongst the masses. Thus, the Vietnamese who had relied on the Japanese throughout the war were 
eventually abandoned.
This bitter experience shows that a good relationship  can be only built on mutual trust, mutual 
understanding, mutual respect and a commitment to protect each other?s legitimate interests. Cooper-
ation should not be used for the sake of one single side at the expense of the other. It should benefit 
both sides and the interests of the people in the region and in the world.
The Second World War has now become the past, though some of its consequences still remain today. 
The two countries had an abnormal relationship in the past, yet this can change, if the people of the 
contemporary generation draw lessons to strive for a better future. As a Japanese Prime Minister once said,
Our actions in the past have brought long-lasting pains, losses and suﬀerings not only to our 
people, but also to those in our Asian neighbouring countries. As a person deeply remorseful 
for the unbearable pains and suﬀerings that many have endured because of the invasion and 
domination by our country, I believe the way forward for Japan is definitely to avoid war at all 
costs, and to dedicate ourselves whole-heartedly to building and protecting world peace. 15
In fact, the mutual relationship of partnership between Vietnam and Japan continues to develop.
15 Quoted in Văn Tạo và Furuta Motoo ed., Nạn đói năm 1945 ở Việt Nam: những chứng tích lịch sử/The 1945 famine in Viet-
nam?Historical evidence (Hanoi: Viện Sử học, 1995), p. 11.
